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ABSTRACT 1 
Purpose: Smart cities provide fully integrated and networked connectivity between digital 2 
infrastructure assets and physical infrastructure to form digital economies. However, industrial 3 
espionage, cyber-crime and deplorable politically driven cyber-interventions threaten to 4 
disrupt and/ or physically damage the critical infrastructure that supports national wealth 5 
generation and preserves the health, safety and welfare of the populous. This research presents 6 
a comprehensive review of cyber-threats confronting critical infrastructure asset management 7 
reliant upon a common data environment (CDE) to augment building information modelling 8 
(BIM) implementation.  9 
Design: An interpretivist, methodological approach to reviewing pertinent literature (that 10 
contained elements of positivism) was adopted. The ensuing mixed methods analysis: reports 11 
upon case studies of cyber-physical attacks; reveals distinct categories of hackers; identifies 12 
and reports upon the various motivations for the perpetrators/ actors; and explains the varied 13 
reconnaissance techniques adopted.   14 
Findings: The paper concludes with direction for future research work and a recommendation 15 
to utilize innovative block chain technology as a potential risk mitigation measure for digital 16 
built environment vulnerabilities.       17 
Originality: Whilst cyber security and digitisation of the built environment have been widely 18 
covered within the extant literature in isolation, scant research has hitherto conducted an 19 
holistic review of the perceived threats, deterrence applications and future developments in a 20 
digitized Architecture, Engineering, Construction and Operations  (AECO) sector. This review 21 
presents concise and lucid reference guidance that will intellectually challenge, and better 22 
inform, both practitioners and researchers in the AECO field of enquiry. 23 
 24 
KEYWORDS: cyber-security, critical infrastructure, cyber–physical attack, BIM, digital 25 
assets, block chain, cyber-deterrence. 26 
 27 
INTRODUCTION  28 
We will neglect our cities to our peril, for in neglecting them we neglect the nation - John F. 29 
Kennedy 30 
Throughout history, buildings and infrastructure (that cumulatively constitute the built 31 
environment) have provided physically secure sanctuaries, protecting inhabitants from theft 32 
and malicious attacks (Toy, 2006). Today’s built environment is no exception and conserves 33 
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this utilitarian physicality. However, contemporary operations and maintenance (O&M) works 34 
have become increasingly dependent upon an expansive web of cyber-physical connectivity. 35 
Such connectivity has been achieved via an amalgamation of smart sensor-based network 36 
technologies (Lin et al., 2006), advanced computerization (Pärn and Edwards, 2017) and 37 
computational intelligence techniques (Bessis, and Dobre 2014).  38 
 39 
Contextualized as virtual assets, the voluminous data and information generated throughout a 40 
development’s whole lifecycle (i.e. design, construction and operations phases) constitutes the 41 
basis for knowledge propagation, insightful business intelligence and an invaluable 42 
commercial commodity (Edwards et al., 2017). Intelligence on infrastructure asset 43 
performance augments decision making via automated analytics geared towards driving 44 
economic prosperity, business profitability and environmental conservation (Lin et al., 2006; 45 
Ryan, 2016). These palpable benefits have steered government reforms globally towards 46 
embedding digitalization throughout the Architecture, Engineering, Construction and 47 
Operations (AECO) sector – a sector that encapsulates includes the whole lifecycle of a 48 
building’s development and subsequent use (Nye, 2017). For example, the UK government’s 49 
mandated policy ‘Digital Built Britain 2025’ represents a prominent epitome of ambitious plans 50 
to coalesce digitized economies and infrastructure deployment (HM Gov, 2015). This strategic 51 
vision has been enacted via the building information modelling (BIM) Level 2 mandate to 52 
extend the frontiers of digitized asset handover for building and infrastructure asset owners 53 
(HM Gov, 2013). BIM has orchestrated a paradigm shift in the way that information is 54 
managed, exchanged and transformed, to stimulating greater collaboration between 55 
stakeholders who interact within a common data environment (CDE) throughout the whole 56 
lifecycle of a development (Eastman et al., 2011).  57 
 58 
Adaptation of a CDE for critical infrastructure developments (i.e. the processes, systems, 59 
technologies and assets essential to economic security and/ or public safety) constitutes a key 60 
facet of effective asset digitalization and offers potential ‘long-term’ lifecycle savings for both 61 
government and private sector funded projects (Bradley et al., 2016). In the ‘short-term’, a 62 
precipitous amount of front-loaded government expenditure earmarked to augment operations 63 
management means that a concerted effort has been made to develop accurate BIM asset 64 
information models (AIM) for large infrastructure asset managers (e.g. utility companies, 65 
Highways England, Network Rail, Environment Agency) (BSI, 2014a).  66 
 67 
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Government policy edict will continue to transform the modus operandi for developing and 68 
maintaining buildings and infrastructure within the smart built environment (Bessis, and 69 
Dobre, 2014). However, the proliferation of cyber-physical connectivity inherent within a CDE 70 
has inadvertently created opportunities for hackers and terrorists, and an omnipresent threat of 71 
cyber-crime prevails (Boyes, 2013a) - yet surprisingly, extant literature is overtly sanguine 72 
about the conspicuous benefits accrued from digitalization (BSI, 2014a, b, and c; HM 73 
Government, 2015). Infrastructure stakeholders (e.g. clients, project managers and designers 74 
and coordinators) are unwittingly confronted by clandestine cyber-assailants targeting critical 75 
infrastructures through a digital portal facilitated by the CDE’s integral networked systems that 76 
support O&M activities (Ficco et al., 2017). Curiously, pertinent literature is replete with 77 
examples of public policy considerations that evaluate critical infrastructure exposed to 78 
intentional attacks, natural disasters or physical accidents (Mayo, 2016). However, the 79 
discourse is comparatively silent on substantial cyber-physical security risks posed by a 80 
wholesale digital shift within the AECO sector (Kello, 2013). Significant risks posed could 81 
disrupt the stream of virtual data produced and in turn, have a profound detrimental impact 82 
upon a virtually enabled built environment, leading to physical interruption and/ or destruction 83 
of infrastructure assets (e.g. electricity generation) thereby endangering members of the public.  84 
 85 
Given this prevailing worldwide menace, a comprehensive literature review of cyber-threats 86 
impacting upon the built environment, and specifically critical infrastructure, is conducted. 87 
Concomitant objectives are to: i) report upon case studies of cyber-physical attack to better 88 
comprehend distinct categories of hackers, their motivations and the reconnaissance techniques 89 
adopted; and ii) explore innovative block chain technology as a potential risk mitigation 90 
measure for digital built environment vulnerabilities. The research concludes with new 91 
hypothesis and research questions that will initiate much needed future investigations and an 92 
expanded academic/practitioner discourse within this novel area.  93 
 94 
THE DIGITAL JACQUERIE  95 
Globally, an insatiable desire within rural communities for economic migration to cities, 96 
continues to engender an upsurge in urbanization – a trend further exacerbated by a projected 97 
9.7 billion population growth by 2050 (UN, 2014a; UN, 2015). For both developed and 98 
developing countries, relentless urbanization presents a complex socio-economic conundrum 99 
and raises portentous political issues such as: deficiencies in health care provisions (UN, 100 
2014b); lack of resources and malnutrition (UN, 2015); and environmental degradation and 101 
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pollution (ibid). These dystopian challenges can be alleviated through for example, shrewd 102 
allocation of resources via social circumscription measures (UN, 2014b). However, politicians 103 
worldwide have also contemplated the implicit assumption of technology inertia as an 104 
impediment to government reform (c.f. Mokyr, 1992). Policies subsequently developed have 105 
responded accordingly by mandating advanced technologies within smart city development as 106 
a panacea to these challenges within the AECO sector – a sector sensu stricto berated for its 107 
reluctance to innovate (BSI, 2014a). Despite a notable disinclination to change, the AECO 108 
sector is widely espoused as being a quintessential economic stimulus (Eastman et al., 2011) - 109 
significantly contributing to gross domestic product (HM Gov, 2015) and providing mass-labor 110 
employment (DBIS, 2013). Consequently, the AECO sector was a prime candidate for the UK 111 
government’s Building Information Modelling (BIM) Level 2 mandate that seeks to immerse 112 
it within a digital economy. Specifically, the Digital Built Britain report (HM Gov, 2015) 113 
aspires that:  114 
 115 
“The UK has the potential to lead one of the defining developments of the 21st century, which 116 
will enable the country to capture not only all of the inherent value in our built assets, but also 117 
the data to create a digital and smart city economy to transform the lives of all.”    118 
 119 
Within this digital insurgency, critical infrastructures are at the forefront of the UK 120 
government’s strategic agenda (Bradley et al., 2016). Unabated advancements in 121 
computerization have widened the capability of decision support to providing appropriate 122 
resolutions to pertinent infrastructure challenges such as: optimizing planning and economic 123 
development (Ryan, 2017); ensuring resilient clean air, water and food supply (ibid); and/ or 124 
safeguarding integrated data and security systems (BSIa 2014). Throughout the various stages 125 
of an infrastructure asset’s lifecycle this transition is further fortified by BIM technology and 126 
the use of a CDE that can improve information and performance management (Pärn and 127 
Edwards, 2017). The palpable benefits of BIM and CDE extend beyond the design and 128 
construction phases into the operations phase of asset occupancy and use. BIM technology’s 129 
innate capability is essential during the asset’s operational phase which constitutes up to 80% 130 
of the overall whole lifecycle expenditure. In congruence with this statistic, the McNulty 131 
(2011) report ambitiously predicts that the potential savings associated with digital asset 132 
management and supply chain management may reach up to £580m between 2018/ 2019 and 133 
will be facilitated through: i) effective communications; ii) the right speed of action; iii) a focus 134 
on detail and change; and iv) incentives and contractual mechanisms that encourage cost 135 
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reduction. For the purpose of this review, digitization is acknowledged to proliferate 136 
throughout all stages of an infrastructure asset’s lifecycle in a smart cities and digital economies 137 
context; such has potentially severe implications businesses and governments who may be 138 
exposed to cyber-crime and -espionage.  139 
 140 
Smart Cities and Digital Economies 141 
The British Standards Institute (BSI, 2014a) defines smart cities as:  142 
 143 
“The effective integration of physical, digital and human systems in the built environment to 144 
deliver a sustainable, prosperous and inclusive future for its citizens.”  145 
 146 
Within practice, the term smart cities is a linguistic locution that encapsulates fully integrated 147 
and networked connectivity between digital infrastructure assets and physical infrastructure 148 
assets to form digital economies (BSI, 2014a). A perspicacious hive mentality is inextricably 149 
embedded within smart city philosophy and serves to augment intelligent analysis of real-time 150 
data and information generated to rapidly optimize decisions in a cost effective manner 151 
(Szyliowicz, 2013; Zamparini and Shiftan, 2013). Consequently, smart cities within the digital 152 
built environment form a cornerstone of a digital economy that seeks to i) provide more with 153 
less; ii) maximize resource availability; iii) reduce cost and carbon emissions (whole lifecycle); 154 
iv) enable significant domestic and international growth; and v) ensure that an economy 155 
remains in the international vanguard (HM Gov, 2015). The unrelenting pace of digitization 156 
worldwide is set to continue with an expected $400bn (US Dollars) investment allocated for 157 
smart city development by 2020; where smart infrastructure will consist of circa 12% of the 158 
cost (DBIS, 2013). Yet, despite this substantial forecast expenditure, scant academic attention 159 
has hitherto been paid to the complex array of interconnected arteries of infrastructural asset 160 
management (e.g. roads, ports, rail, aviation and telecommunications) that provide an essential 161 
gateway to global markets (ibid.).  162 
 163 
The Omnipresent Threat of Cyber-Espionage and Crime   164 
Prior to meticulous review of papers an established understanding of the omnipresent threat of 165 
cyber-espionage and crime is required. The implementation of smart city technologies has 166 
inadvertently increased the risk of cyber-attack facilitated through expansive networked 167 
systems (Mayo, 2016). However, cyber-crime has been largely overlooked within the built 168 
environment and academic consensus concurs that a cavernous gap exists between the state of 169 
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security in practice and the achieved level of security maturity in standards (Markets and 170 
Markets, 2014). Security specialists and practitioners operating smart buildings, grids and 171 
infrastructures are said to coexist in a redundant dichotomy. Instead, academic and policy 172 
attention has focused upon either: i) hypothesized scenarios within international security 173 
studies (e.g. the protection of military, industrial and commercial secrets) (Rid, 2012); ii) policy 174 
planning for cyber-warfare (McGraw, 2013); and/ or iii) the safety of computer systems or 175 
networks per se rather than cyber-physical attack (activities that could severely impact upon 176 
nuclear enrichment, hospital operations, public building operation and maintenance, and traffic 177 
management) (Stoddart, 2016). Threats from cyber-crime have arisen partially because of the 178 
increased adoption rate of networked devices but also as a result of industry’s operational 179 
dependency upon IT systems (Boyes, 2013b).   180 
 181 
Cyber-criminals are particularly adept at harnessing the intrinsic intangible value of digital 182 
assets (BSI, 2015) and can decipher the digital economy and its intricacies more perceptively 183 
than their counterpart industrialists and businesses that are under attack (Kello, 2013). The 184 
most recent ‘WannaCry’ ransomware attack personified the sophisticated measures deployed 185 
by cyber-criminals in navigating networks and identifying, extracting and monetizing data 186 
found (Hunton, 2012). While the inherent value of digital assets to owners and creators is often 187 
indeterminate, cyber-criminals manipulate data and information to encrypt, ransom or sell it 188 
piecemeal (Marinos, 2016). Several prominent instances of unsecure critical infrastructure 189 
assets being physically damaged by persistent cyber-crime have been widely reported upon 190 
(Peng, et al., 2015). These include: the STUXNET worm  that disarmed the Iranian  industrial/ 191 
military assets at a nuclear facility (Lindsay, 2013); and the malware ‘WannaCry’ that caused 192 
significant damage to the UK’s National Health Service (NHS) patient databases, German 193 
railway operations and businesses globally (Clarke and Youngstein, 2017). Cyber-attacks 194 
remain an omnipresent national security threat to a digital economy’s prosperity and digital 195 
built environment’s functionality and safety. Reporting upon a veritable plethora of threats 196 
posed presents significant challenges, as cyber-attacks engender greater anonymity as a 197 
malicious activity (Fisk, 2012). Nevertheless, known cases and revolutionary deterrents will 198 
form the premise upon which this literature review is based.    199 
 200 
 201 
 202 
METHODOLOGY 203 
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The methodology adopted an interpretivist research approach to reviewing extant literature 204 
(Walsham, 1995) that contained elements of positivism, where the latter was founded upon the 205 
assumption that published material has already been scientifically verified by a robust peer 206 
review process. A systematic literature review conducted collected and critically analyzed 207 
results emanating from existing studies found within extant literature, where the literature 208 
constituted data and the population frame (Levy and Ellis, 2006). An iterative, three stage 209 
process was implemented that consisted of: i) a review of cyber-space and cyber-physical 210 
attacks – case studies of cyber-attacks extracted from the Repository of Industrial Security 211 
Incidents (RISI) on-line incident database were reviewed to identify the motivations for 212 
hacking and to delineate and define the various types of hackers (otherwise known as actors); 213 
ii) a componential analysis of literature – a mixed methods componential analysis was 214 
conducted to provide a richer understanding of the established, but fragmented, topic of cyber-215 
crime. A componential analysis is a manual qualitative technique that assigns the meaning of 216 
a word(s) or other linguistic unit(s) to discrete semantic components (Fisher et al., 2018). In 217 
this instance, a cross comparative tabulation matrix of key industries studied and recurrent 218 
emergent themes identified was constructed to present analysis findings; and iii) a report upon 219 
innovative cyber-deterrence techniques – an iterative process flow diagram is utilized to 220 
explain how ‘block chain’ can be successfully employed to provide superior protection against 221 
ensuing cyber-threats (when compared to encryption and firewalls). Collectively, this chain of 222 
documentary evidence and analysis of such, provided a thorough and holistic contextualization 223 
of cyber threats confronting the digital built environment.   224 
 225 
CYBERSPACE, CYBER-PHYSCIAL ATTACKS AND CRITICAL 226 
INFRASTRUCTURE HACKS 227 
In the UK, security analysts from MI5 and MI6 have warned that industrial cyber-espionage is 228 
increasing in prevalence, sophistication and maturity, and could enable an entire shut down of 229 
critical infrastructure and services including power, transport, food and water supplies 230 
(Hjortdal, 2011). A number of pre-eminent politically driven infrastructure intrusions support 231 
this assertion and serve as illustrative examples that a prediction of a global pandemic may 232 
prove to be distressingly accurate. These intrusions include: the Russian led cyber-attacks on 233 
digital infrastructures (banking, news outlets, electronic voting systems) in Estonia in 2007 234 
(Lesk, 2007); the Chinese led hacking of the US electricity network in 2009 (Hjortdal, 2011); 235 
and the US led intrusion of Iranian nuclear plant facilities in 2005 (Dennington, 2012). 236 
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Cyber-space constitutes the global, virtual, computer based and networked environment, 237 
consisting of ‘open’ and ‘air gapped’ internet which directly or indirectly interconnects 238 
systems, networks and other infrastructures critical to society’s needs (European Commission, 239 
2013). Within the vast expanse of cyber-space, Kello (2013) proffers that three partially 240 
overlapping territories coexist, namely: i) the world wide web of nodes accessible via URL; ii) 241 
the internet consisting of interconnected computers; and iii) the ‘cyber-archipelago’ of 242 
computer systems existing in isolation from the internet residing within a so-called air gap. A 243 
CDE hosted on any of the aforementioned territories is precariously exposed to cyber-physical 244 
attack.  245 
 246 
<Insert Figure 1 about here>   247 
 248 
Cyber-attack utilizes code to interfere with the functionality of a computer system for strategic, 249 
ambiguous, experimental or political purposes (Nye, 2017). Ghandi et al., (2011) expand upon 250 
this definition, stating that cyber-attack constitutes: “any act by an insider or an outsider that 251 
compromises the security expectations of an individual, organization, or nation.” Cyber-252 
attacks can take many forms, for example, from publicized web defacements, information 253 
leaks, denial-of-service attacks (DoS), and other cyber actions sometimes related to national 254 
security or military affairs. Cyber-physical attacks can cause disruption or damage to physical 255 
assets thus posing serious threats to public health and safety, and/ or the desecration of the 256 
environment (Peng et al., 2015). One of the earliest publicly disclosed cyber-physical attacks 257 
took place during the Cold War period, when a Soviet oil pipeline exploded due to a so-called 258 
logic bomb. The NIST (2014) framework for enhancing the ability of critical infrastructures to 259 
withstand cyber-physical attacks proposes that two distinct dichotomous domains must be 260 
secured, namely: information technologies (IT) and industrial control systems (ICS) 261 
(Rittinghouse and Hancock, 2003). Common threats incurred via IT and ICS include: i) theft 262 
of intellectual property; ii) massive disruption to existing operations; and iii) destruction, 263 
degradation or disablement of physical assets and operational ability (Szyliowicz, 2013). The 264 
European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) outlines multiple 265 
common sources of nefarious attacks in its malware taxonomy, including: viruses; worms; 266 
trojans; botnets; spywares; scarewares; roguewares; adwares; and greywares (Marinos, 2016).  267 
 268 
Such attacks are made possible via a huge cyber-attack surface within cyber-space, where every 269 
circa 2,500 lines of code presents a potential vulnerability that is identified by a hacker’s 270 
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reconnaissance (Nye, 2017). Reconnaissance is the first and most important stage for a 271 
successful cyber-attack and seeks to determine the likely strategy for the intrusion (Marinos, 272 
2016). Strategies vary but prominent methods include: scanning; fingerprinting; footprinting; 273 
sniffing; and social engineering (refer to Table 3). 274 
 275 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 276 
 277 
CYBER-ATTACK MOTIVATIONS AND CYBER ACTORS AND INCIDENT 278 
ANALYSIS 279 
The RISI database contains a comprehensive record of cyber-physical attack incidents 280 
categorized as either confirmed or likely but confirmed (RISI, 2015). However, prominent 281 
commentators contend that attacks are more prevalent than reports suggest and that victims are 282 
often reluctant to disclose malicious cyber-attacks against themselves due to potential 283 
reputational damage being incurred (Reggiani, 2013). Cyber-physical attacks are therefore 284 
shrouded in secrecy by states and private companies, and many states have already conceded 285 
the current digital arms race against a panoply of cyber-actors (or ‘hackers’) including: 286 
hacktivists, malware authors, cyber-criminals, cyber-militias, cyber-terrorists, patriot hackers 287 
and script kiddies.  288 
 289 
Cyber-actors are frequently classified within one of three thematic categories, namely: i) White 290 
Hats; ii) Grey Hats; and ii) Black Hats, where the colour of the hat portrays their intrinsic 291 
intentions. White Hats are predominantly legitimately employed security researchers who 292 
perform simulated penetration testing hacks to assess the robustness of an organization’s cyber-293 
enabled systems (Cavelty, 2013). They do not have malevolent intentions but rather act on 294 
behalf of security companies and concomitant public interest (F-Secure, 2014). Contemporary 295 
cyber-Robin Hood(s) (or hacktivists) fall within the Grey Hat category and act as vigilantes to 296 
puncture prevailing power structures (such as Government) by embarrassing them with denial 297 
of dervice (DDos) attacks, web defacements, malware, ransomware and trojans. These 298 
hacktivists often dabble with illegal means to hack but believe that they are addressing a social 299 
injustice and/ or otherwise supporting a good cause. Black Hats are often affiliated with a 300 
criminal fraternity or have other malicious intent (Cavelty, 2013). These criminals deploy the 301 
same tools used by grey and white hat hackers, but with the deliberate intention to cause harm, 302 
vandalism, sabotage, website shutdown, fraud or other illegitimate activities. Many states have 303 
increasingly focused upon Grey Hats who have become the new uncontrolled source of hacking 304 
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(Betz and Stevens, 2013). Table 4 highlights a number of prominent critical infrastructures 305 
hacks extracted from the RISI database and cross references these against the motivations and 306 
cyber-actors.  307 
 308 
<Insert Table 4 about here > 309 
 310 
Blurred Lines: Governments and Civilians 311 
State and non-state actors represent a two pronged source of malicious attacks or threats facing 312 
the AECO sector; motivations for these actors are fueled by various catalysts, including 313 
patriotism, liberal activism, political ideology, criminal intent and hobby interests (Hjortdal, 314 
2011; Rahimi, 2011). A state is a political entity (‘government’) that has sovereignty over an 315 
area of territory and the people within it (ibid.). Within this entity, state actors are persons who 316 
are authorized to act on its behalf and are therefore subject to regulatory control measures (Betz 317 
and Stevens, 2013). A state actor’s role can be myriad but often it strives to create positive 318 
policy outcomes through approaches such as social movement coalitions (cf. Stearns and 319 
Almeida, 2004). Conversely, non-state actors are persons or organizations who have sufficient 320 
political influence to act or participate in international relations for the purpose of exerting 321 
influence or causing change even though they are not part of government or an established 322 
institution (Betz and Stevens, 2013). Three key types of legitimate non-state actors exist: i) 323 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) such as the United Nations, World Bank Group and 324 
International Monetary Fund, which are established by a state usually through a treaty (ibid); 325 
ii) international non-government organizations (NGOs) such as Amnesty International, Oxfam 326 
and Greenpeace which are non-profit, voluntary organizations that advocate or otherwise 327 
pursue the public good (i.e. economic development and humanitarian aid) (UN); and iii) 328 
multinational corporations (MNCs) who pursue their own business interests largely outside the 329 
control of national states (UN). Illegitimate non-state actors include terrorist groups and 330 
hacktivists acting upon a range of different motivations including personal gain, digital 331 
coercion, malevolence and indoctrination of others using ideological doctrine (Brantly, 2014). 332 
Since the millennium, governments globally have become increasingly aware of cyber-crime 333 
and threats stemming from such non-state actors. Some of the more notable actors include: 334 
Anonymous (Betz and Stevens, 2013); Ghost Net (Hunton, 2012); The Red Hacker Alliance 335 
(Fisher, 2018); Fancy Bear ‘Прикольный медведь’ (Canfil, 2016); and Iranian Cyber Army 336 
(Rahimi, 2011).   337 
 338 
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However, the boundary delineation between state actors and non-state actors engaging in 339 
cyber-physical attacks has become increasingly blurred (Betz and Stevens, 2013, Papa, 2013). 340 
Such attribution has wider implications for the national security of states and national 341 
responsibility for non-state actors who often act on behalf of the state, under incitement of 342 
nationalistic and ideological motivation (Brantly, 2014). Henderson (2008) aptly describes 343 
such blurred lines between governments and civilians by using Chinese cyber-patriot hackers 344 
as an exemplar:  345 
 346 
“The alliance is exactly who and what they claim to be: an independent confederation of 347 
patriotic youth dedicated to defending China against what it perceives as threats to national 348 
pride.” 349 
 350 
A COMPONENTIAL ANALYSIS OF LITERATURE 351 
From an operational perspective, the review protocol sourced published journal materials 352 
contained within Science Direct, Web of Science, Scopus and Research Gate databases. 353 
Keyword search terms used included: cyber-security, hacking and any of the following 354 
variations of the word cyber crime/ cybercrime/ or cyber-crime. Following a comprehensive 355 
review of the journals, four prominent and pertinent clusters of industrial settings were selected 356 
to provide the contextual sampling framework and knowledge base for the analysis, namely: i) 357 
AECO; ii) transport and infrastructure; iii) information technology; and iv) political science/ 358 
international relations. These clusters were selected because they contained the majority of the 359 
journal publications on cyber-crime. Within the clusters, six recurrent leitmotifs were 360 
identified: i) national and global security; ii) smart cities; iii) critical infrastructure;  iv) 361 
industrial control systems; v) mobile or cloud computing; and vi) digitalization of the built 362 
environment. A cross comparative componential analysis was then conducted (refer to Table 363 
1).  364 
 365 
<Insert Table 1 about here > 366 
 367 
The componential analysis reveals: i) the percentage frequency that each of the identified 368 
thematic groups occur across the four industrial classifications; and ii) the percentage 369 
frequency that each thematic group occurs within each individual industrial classification. In 370 
ascending order of frequency across all four sectors, the most popular discussed topics were: 371 
mobile cloud computing (59.5%); national global security (54.7%) and critical infrastructure 372 
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(50%); smart cities (40.4%); industrial control systems (40.4%); and digitization of the built 373 
environment (28.5%). Yet curiously within the AECO sector, an inordinate amount of effort 374 
was input into mobile and cloud computing (90%); and digitization of the built environment 375 
(60%) while far less attention was paid to critical infrastructure (30%); and national and global 376 
security (20%). Moreover, none of the papers reviewed were heavily focused upon expounding 377 
the virtues and concomitant benefits of digitization but were similarly obvious to the 378 
omnipresent threat of cyber-crime posed via the vulnerable CDE portal.        379 
 380 
A CDE is commonly established during the feasibility or concept design phases of a 381 
development (BSI2014a, b). An information manager will then manage and validate the 382 
processes and procedures for the exchange of information across a network for each key 383 
decision gateway stage (including: work in progress (WIP), shared, published and archive 384 
stages). Cloud-based CDE platforms are ubiquitous but common solutions include: 385 
ProjectWise; Viewpoint (4P); Aconex; Asite; and SharePoint (Shafiq et al., 2013). The internal 386 
work flow and typical external information exchange in BIM relies upon the re-use and sharing 387 
of information in a CDE. Integrating BIM (and other file databases e.g. IFC, GBXML, CSV, 388 
DWG, XML) within a CDE ensures a smooth flow of information between all stakeholders 389 
and is specified and articulated through its levels of development or design (Eastman, 2011; 390 
Lin and Su, 2013). The level of design (LOD) is classified on a linear scale ranging from LOD 391 
1 (covering a conceptual ‘low definition’ design) to LOD 7 (for an as-built ‘high definition’ 392 
model). With each incremental increase in LOD, the range and complexity of asset information 393 
within models built begins to swell and the data contained within becomes accessible to an 394 
increased amount of stakeholders. As a consequence, the magnitude of potential cyber-crime 395 
also increases and it is imperative therefore, that effective cyber-security deterrence measures 396 
are set. 397 
 398 
Perhaps the most crippling aspect of deterrence is the poor rate of attribution (also known as 399 
tracebacking or source tracking); where attribution seeks to determine the identity or location 400 
of an attacker or attacker’s intermediary (Brantly, 2014). Affiliation further exacerbates 401 
aattribution rates, for example, nefarious and malicious attacks on critical infrastructure by 402 
non-state ‘patriot’ actors who proclaim cyber-warfare in the name of nationalist ideologies can 403 
create ambiguity with state actors (Lindsay, 2015). Extant literature widely acknowledges that 404 
states actively recruit highly skilled hackers to counter-attack other state governed cyber-405 
activities, in particular against critical infrastructure assets (Thomas, 2009). Yet the paucity of 406 
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identification or disclosure of attacker identities has made the hacking culture even more 407 
enticing for both non-state actors and state actors. Whilst network attribution or IP address 408 
traceability to a particular geographical region is possible, lifting the cyber veil to reveal the 409 
affiliation between the attacker and their government remains difficult (Canfil, 2016). In the 410 
case of potential threats to the AECO sector, attribution of industrial cyber-espionage remains 411 
an imminent threat not only to the business in operation but also for the nation state security.  412 
 413 
CYBER-DETERRENCE  414 
Cyber-deterrence measures rely largely upon good practice adopted from standards ISO 27001 415 
and ISO 27032 (ISO, 2013; ISO, 2012). In the context of the digital built environment (and 416 
specifically BIM), recently published cyber-security good practice manual PAS 1198-Part 5 417 
suggests deploying five measures of deterrence: i) a built asset security manager; ii) a built 418 
asset security strategy (BASS); iii) a built asset security management plan (BASMP); iv) a 419 
security breach/ incident management plan (SB/IMP); and v) built asset security information 420 
requirements (BASIR). For other sources of cyber-security guidance PAS 1198-Part 5 421 
recommends adherence to other pre-existing legislative documentation – refer to Table 2. 422 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 423 
 424 
Other ambiguous guidance notes that refer to taking ‘appropriate mitigation strategies’ have 425 
largely ignored the increased vulnerability of semantic and geometric information that is 426 
sustained within a BIM (BSI, 2013; BSI, 2014c). For example Institute of Engineering and 427 
Technology (Boyes, 2013b) report, entitled: ‘Resilience and Cyber Security of Technology in 428 
the Built Environment’, states that:  429 
 430 
“Unauthorised access to BIM data could jeopardise security of sensitive facilities, such as 431 
banks, courts, prisons and defence establishments, and in fact most of the Critical National 432 
Infrastructure.”  433 
 434 
Deterrence measures recommended in PAS 1192-5 have largely overlooked BIM data 435 
contained within a CDE and the onslaught of cyber-physical connectivity in critical 436 
infrastructures (Liu et al., 2012). Currently, the most common means of deterrence for cyber-437 
physical connectivity in critical BMS infrastructures is via network segregation (the firewall) 438 
(Mayo, 2016) and secure gateway protection (encryption) for securing from external threats 439 
complicit with ANSI/ISA-99 (ANSI, 2007). However, in a digital economy where over 50 440 
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billion devices are continuously communicating, neither firewalls nor encryption alone can 441 
guarantee effective cyber-security. Hence, a more robust systemic means of data integrity is 442 
required in the digital built environment. 443 
 444 
Block Chain - A New Frontier for Cyber-Deterrence  445 
Under the alias Satoshi Namamoto, the Bitcoin (cryptocurrency) was published as the first 446 
block chain application on the internet (Turk, and Klinc, 2017). This advancement opened a 447 
springboard of applications that utilize block chain technology to remove third party 448 
distribution of digital assets using peer-to-peer sharing (ibid). Whilst the majority of current 449 
applications have utilized crypto currency and smart contracts, the applications for digital asset 450 
transference seem limitless. Block chain’s earliest applications were in economics (Huckle et 451 
al., 2016); software engineering (Turk, and Klinc, 2017); Internet of Things (Zhang and Wen, 452 
2016); and medicine (Yue et al., 2016) – albeit, more recently applications within the built 453 
environment have been explored (Sun et al., 2016). Block chain technology has the potential 454 
to overcome the aforementioned cyber-security challenges faced in the digital environment, as 455 
a result of its distributed, secure and private nature of data distribution. A positive correlation 456 
exists between an increasing number of collaborators (or peers) within a CDE and the potential 457 
to secure such assets in a peer-to-peer environment which thrives and increases in security. 458 
 459 
Block chain technology is suitable for sectors with increased risk of: i) fraud – such as 460 
susceptible, crucial infrastructures containing sensitive industrial information that is at risk 461 
from industrial espionage, ii) intermediaries - for example, providers of BMS systems and 462 
other IT software vendors hosting sensitive infrastructure asset details; iii) throughput – such 463 
as operators updating and sharing asset information in a CDE; and iv) stable data - for instance, 464 
data generated for built assets can be utilized for up to 40 years post project inception. Block 465 
chain technology offers better encryption against hacking than any other current deterrence 466 
measures available and is commonly suggested in the cyber-security standards available (Turk, 467 
and Klinc, 2017). 468 
 469 
<Insert Figure 2 about here > 470 
 471 
The application of block chain technology within digital built asset information exchange is 472 
suggested due to its secure framework for data transference. Block chain technology has been 473 
hailed as a hacker/ tamper safe ecosystem for digital asset transfers (ibid). Figure 2 delineates 474 
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a ten stage process to demonstrate how the existing functionality of block chain technology can 475 
be harnessed in a CDE environment when sharing sensitive digital information about assets - 476 
viz: i) asset information is securely shared via a network (e.g. url nodes, interconnected 477 
computer networks or an air gapped internet); ii) asset data (whether a 3D or digital model) is 478 
converted into a block which represents a digital transaction of asset data; iii) stakeholder 479 
interaction within a federated CDE environment will receive a tracked record of the individual 480 
transaction created by nodes sharing the block; iv) block chain miners (usually computer 481 
scientists) validate and maintain the newly created block chain; v) payment methods for block 482 
chain miners vary but a group of miners enter into a competitive process where the first to 483 
validate the block chain receives payment; vi) the federated block chain environment is 484 
approved; vii) the new block is added to the existing chain of digital transactions to extend the 485 
block chain; viii) the digital asset can now be securely shared upon validation; ix) to hack the 486 
network, assailants would need to hack every single node within the block chain, thus making 487 
the task far more difficult; x) the network of nodes created by multiple stakeholders’ 488 
transactions provides a more sophisticated and secure approach to protecting digital assets 489 
when compared to encryption and firewalls. Herein lies the novelty of this review – blockchain 490 
technology can offer a potential framework to future AECO software applications and systems 491 
designed to secure the transfer of sensitive project data in a BIM and CDE environment.   492 
 493 
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK 494 
Contrary to within the fields of computer science, political science/ international relations and 495 
international law, cyber-security is far less understood within the AECO sector (Mayo, 2016). 496 
Consequently, existing controls are inadequate and poorly managed. Key findings emanating 497 
from these other eminent fields provide invaluable insights into the cyber-security technologies 498 
and developments that can be successfully transferred and applied to critical infrastructure 499 
within the AECO sector to address current deficiencies (Baumeister, 2010). However, 500 
successful practitioner alignment and knowledge enhancement requires time and investment 501 
for additional research and testing of such concepts (Metke and Ekl, 2010) - such exceeded the 502 
current confines of this review paper. Within the international security research realm, the 503 
following predispositions have weakened scholarly understanding of cyber-threat occurrences 504 
and the likelihood of attacks on critical infrastructure. These limitations require future work, 505 
namely:   506 
 507 
17 
 
i) Improved understanding of motivations – an inordinate amount of attention is paid to 508 
‘cyber-threats’ under the guise of malevolent lines of code. Yet finding a resolution to 509 
the root cause of cyber-crime requires a deeper understanding of the motivations behind 510 
such malicious scripts and attacks;  511 
ii) Address the specific operational threats to bespoke critical infrastructure – each 512 
individual critical infrastructure project (e.g. hospitals, nuclear facilities, traffic 513 
management systems) has bespoke operational functionality and hence different 514 
vulnerabilities. Mapping of these vulnerabilities is required as a first step to developing 515 
efficient and effective risk mitigation strategies to better secure assets;  516 
iii) Distinguish between physical destruction and theft – literature and standards have 517 
predominantly focused upon data protection within the context of cyber-attack. 518 
However, physical damage has received far less attention even though such could lead 519 
to catastrophic economic damage. Greater distinction between physical destruction and 520 
theft is therefore needed to delineate the scale and magnitude of cyber-crime;   521 
iv) Consolidate greater international governmental collaboration - cyber-attacks can 522 
readily cross international borders and national law enforcement agencies often find it 523 
difficult to take action in jurisdictions where limited extradition arrangements are 524 
available. Although standard international agreements have been made on such issues 525 
(c.f. the Budapest Convention on Cyber-crime), which seek to criminalize malevolent 526 
cyber-activities, notable signatories (such as China and Russia) are absent. Far greater 527 
cooperation between sovereign states is therefore urgently needed to develop robust 528 
international agreements that are supported by all major governments.;  529 
v) Gauge practitioner awareness – future work should seek to identify existing 530 
predispositions and awareness of cyber-attack and cyber-crime amongst AECO 531 
professionals either through in depth interviews or practitioner surveys. Case studies 532 
are also required to measure and report upon contemporary industry practice and how 533 
any cyber-crime incidents were managed; and    534 
vi) Proof of concept – Development and testing of an innovative proof of concept 535 
blockchain application specifically designed for AECO professionals. Such 536 
developmental work would allow the thorough testing of blockchain technology in 537 
practice to confirm or otherwise its effectiveness.  538 
 539 
To reconcile the challenges of future work, researchers and practitioners within the AECO 540 
sector will have to investigate how to adopt cyber-deterrence approaches applied within more 541 
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technologically advanced and sensitive industries such as aerospace and automotive. Such 542 
knowledge transference may propagate readily available solutions to challenges posed. Cyber-543 
security awareness and deterrence measures within the BIM and CDE process will help secure 544 
critical infrastructure, developed, built and utilized – the challenges and opportunities 545 
identified here require innovative solutions such as block chain technologies to transform 546 
standard industry practice and should be augmented with far greater industry-academic 547 
collaboration. 548 
 549 
CONCLUSION 550 
Infrastructure provides the essential arteries and tributaries of a digital built environment that 551 
underpins a contemporary digital economy. However, cyber-attack threatens the availability 552 
and trustworthiness of interdependent networked services on both corporate and national 553 
security levels. At particular risk are the critical infrastructure assets (such as energy networks, 554 
transport and financial services) hosted on large networks connected to the internet (via a CDE) 555 
to enable cost-efficient remote monitoring and maintenance. Any disruption or damage to these 556 
assets could have an immediate and widespread impact by jeopardizing the well-being, safety 557 
and security of citizens. To combat the potential threat posed, greater awareness among AECO 558 
stakeholders is urgently needed; this must include governments internationally and private 559 
sector partners collaborating together to expand upon existing ISO and BIM-related standards 560 
for improved response to a cyber incident. As well as preventative measures, reactive national 561 
plans are required (i.e. raising cyber security awareness on government funded BIM projects) 562 
to quickly deal with breaches in security and ensure services are provided with minimum 563 
disruption.    564 
 565 
It is argued in this paper that the CDE adopted with BIM in the AECO sector acts as a 566 
springboard for the wider stakeholder engagement with networked data sharing in a centralized 567 
manner yielding such systems vulnerable for future cyber-physical attacks. The pinnacle of 568 
cyber-security research breakthroughs in cryptography have resulted in the development of 569 
decentralized block chain technology. It is hypothesized that block chain technology offers a 570 
novel and secure approach to storing information, making data transactions, performing 571 
functions, and establishing trust, making it suitable for sensitive digital infrastructure data 572 
contained in BIM and CDE environment high security requirements. Whilst block chain 573 
applications are largely at a nascent stage of development within the AECO sector, this review 574 
paper has highlighted its novel application to fortify security of digital assets residing within a 575 
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BIM and CDE environment – thus extending applications beyond its origins in cryptocurrency. 576 
Future research will be required to prove, modify or disprove this hypothesis presented. 577 
However, block chain alone cannot guarantee total immunity to cyber–attacks so additional 578 
research is required to: understand the motivations for cyber-attack/ crime; identify the specific 579 
operational threats to bespoke critical infrastructure and develop appropriate strategies to 580 
mitigate these; develop more exhaustive international standards (or enhance existing standards) 581 
to distinguish between physical destruction and theft; and establish measures needed to 582 
consolidate greater international governmental collaboration.   583 
  584 
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Table 2 – Industry Standards and Codes of Best Practice on Cyber Security in the AECO Sector.
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Table 3 - Common Reconnaissance Techniques 
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Table 4 - Snapshot of Cyber-physical Hacking Examples from the RISI Online Incident Database [available online at http://www.risidata.com/]
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Figure 1 - Cyber Vulnerabilities of CDE Environment adapted from BSI Levels of BIM  
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Figure 2 - Block Chain Technology Application with Digital Built Asset Information Exchange 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
